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CNAC and its Russian counterpart, ISKRAN, held their 15th seminar here at CNAC on 7 December 2001. This is a report of that seminar. The report is also based on other discussions the Russian visitors had in the Washington area, including with Deputy Secretary of State Armitage and Vice Admiral Keating, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations. The CNAC Annual Conference, to the fall of 1991, when we invited Andrey Kokoshin, among others to the CNAC Annual Conference. To the fall of 1991, when a CNA group took its first trip to Moscow, and the spring of 1992, when the first CNAC-ISKRAN seminar was held, here in Washington. The discussions focused on new opportunities for Russian American relations and for NATO-Russian cooperation following September 11, following President Putin's initiative to support the United States on September 24, and following the Bush-Putin summit meeting in November ("the Crawford Summit"). These discussions stood in some contrast to the discussions we held in Moscow in July 2001. Then there was an almost complete obsession among our Russian interlocutors, with the impending demise of the ABM treaty, and with it, as they said, the end of strategic stability. There was also a discussion during the seminar on whether the last decade had seen a great deal of progress in the improvement of U.S.-Russian relations or was a time of wasted opportunities during which the chances for a real Russian-American partnership, especially in matters of security, were squandered.

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U.S.-Russian Cooperation after September 11, 2001

**Report of the 15th CNAC-ISKRAN seminar
and other discussions, 4-10 December 2001**

**H. H. Gaffney
Dmitry Gorenburg**



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January 2002



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Contents

Introduction	1
Looking back at the last decade	3
A time of wasted opportunities...	3
...Or a period of progress?	4
A new relationship?	7
Preventing terrorism	8
Economic integration	9
Arms control and treaties	10
The NATO-Russia relationship	13
Mechanisms for NATO-Russian cooperation	13
Issues to be addressed by the NATO-Russia Council	15
Naval relations	17
Status of the U.S.-Russian relationship	19
What does the longer run look like?	20
Appendix	23
How NATO works: a one-page summary	23

Introduction

CNAC and its Russian counterpart, ISKRAN, held their 15th seminar here at CNAC on 7 December.¹ This is a report of that seminar. The report is also based on other discussions the Russian visitors had in the Washington area, including with Deputy Secretary of State Armitage and Vice Admiral Keating, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations.

The CNAC program dates back to the fall of 1990, when we invited Andrey Kokoshin, among others, to the CNAC Annual Conference, to the fall of 1991, when a CNAC group took its first trip to Moscow, and the spring of 1992, when the first CNAC-ISKRAN seminar was held, here in Washington.

We made a major contribution to history in December 1991, when Senators Nunn and Levin met at CNAC with Kokoshin and Sergey Rogov and heard them warn about the perils of "loose Russian nukes," which prompted Nunn shortly thereafter to initiate the Nunn-Lugar program.²

On this occasion, the Russian group included Dr. Sergey Rogov, Director of ISKRAN; Colonel General Viktor Yesin, in charge of mili-

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1. CNAC is The CNA Corporation. ISKRAN is the Institute for USA and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. It was founded by Georgiy Arbatov. Dr. Sergey Rogov succeeded Dr. Arbatov as director. CNAC is a Federally-Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) and receives most of its funds from the Defense Department. ISKRAN receives its basic funds from the Academy of Sciences. This makes both institutions "semi-governmental."
 2. Senator Nunn had proposed a billion dollar assistance program for Russia, but it was not making progress in the Senate. After the meeting at CNA, he revised it to cover only nuclear weapons, at a \$500 million level, and it was subsequently legislated and persists to this day.

tary reform on the Security Council and the former chief targeteer of Soviet nuclear missiles against the U.S.; Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov, who has been deeply involved in arms control treaties in the Ministry of Defense since 1989 and is soon to be the Russian military representative to the NATO Military Committee; and Vice Admiral Nikolay Konorev, Head of Plans and Operations in Main Navy Staff and a confidant of the Commander in Chief of the Russian Federation Navy, Fleet Admiral Kuroyedov.

The discussions focused on new opportunities for Russian American relations and for NATO-Russian cooperation following September 11, following President Putin's initiative to support the U.S. on September 24, and following the Bush-Putin summit meeting in November ("the Crawford Summit"). These discussions stood in some contrast to the discussions we held in Moscow in July 2001. Then, there was an almost complete obsession among our Russian interlocutors with the impending demise of the ABM treaty, and with it, as they said, the end of strategic stability.

The CNAC group repeatedly warned its Russian interlocutors in July that this administration was very anti-treaties, and, as far as a working ABM system went, the U.S. had a long way to go in making the technology work and finding the funding for whatever system was then planned. The recent cancellation of the most modest of Navy TBMD programs—Navy area defense—because the program was two years behind schedule and was not working, merely points up these difficulties, whatever program may eventually be substituted in the Navy.

We had also discussed Russia and European security and the Russia-China-U.S. triangle in July, but the discussions on these subjects were less contentious; the mutual security agreement that Russia and China had signed in July was not regarded as threatening to anyone, nor did it amount to a formal defense alliance.

Looking back at the last decade

There was a discussion during the seminar on whether the last decade had seen a great deal of progress in the improvement of U.S.-Russian relations or was a time of wasted opportunities during which the chances for a real Russian-American partnership, especially in matters of security, were squandered.

A time of wasted opportunities...

Those who saw the glass as half empty argued that the bright promise of a mutual security partnership seen at the beginning of the 1990s, especially given Soviet cooperation in opposing Saddam Hussein, had been betrayed. As the Russians noted, instead of Secretary of State James Baker's vision of a mutual security sphere extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok, the 1990s saw NATO enlargement to the east at about the same time as the NATO air war in Kosovo, with both initiatives undertaken despite strong Russian opposition. Another irritant in relations for the Russians was U.S. insistence on developing missile defense systems despite the constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty.

Americans saw Russian criticism of these actions as residues of Cold War thinking. The U.S. also felt let down by Russian opposition to "smart sanctions" on Iraq and their continuing military sales to Iran.

Russian behavior in the security sphere disappointed many Americans, who expected to develop a strategic partnership with the Yeltsin government, beginning with START II and the Helsinki agreement. Frequently during the past decade, Russia was seen by Americans as acting in ways that threatened to destabilize its neighbors. Such actions included assistance to secessionist rebels in conflicts in the Caucasus and Moldova in the early 1990s, veiled threats to the Baltic states if they did not treat their Russian minorities well, and the two invasions of Chechnya. Russia, on the other hand, perceived criticism

of such actions as either anti-Russian bias or interference in Russia's internal affairs or in their traditional sphere of influence.

The troubled course of Russia's economic reform was another source of resentment between the two sides. Many Russians blamed the country's economic decline during the 1990s on bad American advice, with some politicians going so far as to blame the U.S. for deliberately plotting to destroy Russia by wrecking its economic system. At the same time, the U.S. was dismayed by the rampant crime and corruption that accompanied Russian reform efforts.

These mutual recriminations over security and economic issues showed that despite friendly relations at the top level, there remained a lack of trust between the Russian and American security communities. This lack of trust was increased by the disappointment of unmet expectations. Many expected that the end of the Cold War would lead to a commonality of interests between the two superpowers and thus to an agreement on actions on the basis of these interests. When interests diverged, long-held suspicions of the other side reemerged, leading many to conclude that the two sides had wasted an opportunity to forge a new world order.

...Or a period of progress?

Those who see the glass as half full point to the positive cooperative programs that have been implemented despite suspicions leftover from the Cold War. The most notable practical achievement has been the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. This program has played a major role in dismantling the now unnecessary Soviet strategic nuclear forces and reducing the danger of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands.

Joint peacekeeping operations, first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, were another set of practical actions that would have been unimaginable during the Cold War. The cooperation necessary to make this arrangement work has increased the level of understanding between Western and Russian armed forces while also bringing Russia one small step closer to integration into Western security regimes.

Some participants argued that despite the lack of major treaties in recent years, a great deal of progress had been made on arms control. START II and the Helsinki agreement were noted as particular accomplishments in this area, but the Duma's delays in ratifying START II effectively killed it, as U.S. Senate opposition to the ABM Treaty and its proposed amendments grew.

Most importantly, the new relationship has allowed for an increase in contacts between ministries and militaries that have vastly increased each side's understanding of the other. These contacts have helped each side to largely neutralize its image of the other as a hostile power. Instead of competing over whether capitalism or communism should form the basis of world order, both sides now share similar political and economic systems, even if these are at different stages of development.

Even in areas where there has been tension, such as relations between Russia and NATO, there is far more cooperation now than there was ten years ago. Despite its flaws, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council has increased interaction between Russia and NATO, a NATO liaison mission in Moscow has been reopened, and the possibility of further cooperation exists through the Committee of 20 mechanism that has been approved in principle and whose details are to be worked out by May 2002.

Optimists would argue that what the pessimists see as a lack of progress in improving U.S.-Russian relations over the last decade is actually the result of the inflated expectations, rather than an actual lack of progress. The pessimists reply that while this may be true, much more could have been achieved had the two sides not wasted the opportunities they were presented by the end of the Cold War.

A new relationship?

The seminar participants agreed that events of the last several months have dramatically increased the likelihood of further progress in building U.S.-Russian relations. Both the common interest in preventing terrorism in the wake of September 11 and the strong personal relationship between Presidents Putin and Bush that emerged during 2001 have led to a consensus that Russia and the United States are at a point where they could overcome the mutual distrust that remained at the end of the 1990s.

Many of the recent positive developments in bilateral relations can be attributed to the strength of the Bush-Putin personal relationship. The personal connection has made major policy disagreements seem less significant and perhaps resolvable. Bush has decided that Putin, and therefore Russia, must be respected.

Some of the participants noted, however, a personal relationship between top leaders is not a sufficient base on which to form a new strategic partnership. Some on the Russian side claimed that, during the electoral campaign just 18 months ago, candidate Bush argued that nothing good can come from Russia. They were concerned that, while relations are good now, without a firm institutional basis the pendulum might swing back in the other direction. For instance, there was a great deal of concern on both sides that the eagerness for a new start displayed by the top leadership was not felt among either country's second and third tier officials who would actually be responsible for implementing the practical measures that might institutionalize the new relationship.

There was concern that those within the U.S. administration that are opposed to international cooperation have only been temporarily silenced. Similarly, there was concern that top Russian officials are only doing the bare minimum to comply with President Putin's state-

ments pressing for a new Russian relationship with the West. We were assured that the Security Council staff was quite supportive of Putin.

At the same time, there has been significant progress in changing public perceptions. The number of Russians who perceive the United States as an enemy declined from 49 percent in August to 29 percent in late November 2001. Fifty percent of Russians see America as a friend, while 65 percent of Americans see Russia as a friend.

The participants agreed that, in order to preserve the positive turn in Russian-American relations, the two governments need to go beyond identifying common interests by developing mechanisms for common decision-making. They must also be realistic in setting goals so as to avoid disappointments. The Russians recognize that, even with the current positive trends and the best possible policies, it would take decades for Russia to become a full member of the Western community.

Much of the discussion about areas with the greatest potential for cooperation in the near term focused on three topics: preventing terrorism, economic integration, and reducing nuclear weapon stocks. These are addressed in turn below.

Preventing terrorism

Upon September 11, the U.S. and Russia discovered they had a common enemy—global Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. Putin took bold steps, despite the opposition of his bureaucracy and his military, to support the U.S.—though General Yesin told us that his Security Council was with him all the way and prepared his positions. Putin has said all along that he is oriented to Europe and the West. As General Yesin said, they had made their choice—the choice is not Asia. Moreover, as Dr. Rogov points out, Putin used the term “shared democratic values” for the first time.

At the same time, participants agreed that the fight against terrorism is not a sufficient basis on which to build long-term Russian-American cooperation. But everyone agreed that it was something that both

sides could use to improve bilateral relations in the interim, given their common interests in defeating terrorism.

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, Putin took several concrete steps to demonstrate his commitment to cooperate with the United States in the war against terrorism. He associated Russia with the Article 5 declaration by the other NATO countries, thus opening the door to new initiatives for NATO-Russian cooperation. He overcame the old hands' aversion to U.S. involvement in Central Asia, giving the U.S. overflight rights and acquiescing in its initiatives with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. By several accounts, Russia intelligence has also been extremely useful in pursuing the war in Afghanistan.

The real test of cooperation on terrorism will come after the defeat of al Qaeda, when the coalition turns to other potential terrorist threats. There may be some disagreement between the U.S. and Russia on which countries constitute such threats and what actions are legitimate in the next phase of the war effort. This is a strong reason for institutionalizing the current cooperative relationship in a way that allows the two countries to continue to reach consensus.

Economic integration

Economic interdependence was one form of institutionalization discussed during the seminar. As Dr. Rogov noted, economic interdependence is the glue that holds the Western community together. If Russia is to belong to the Western community, it will have to tie its economy to those of Europe and the United States. However, there are few active measures that can be taken by the international community or the United States to speed up the process. WTO accession would help, but would require substantial Russian commitment and progress in internal economic reform if Russia is to attract foreign investment and to generate competitive goods.

Although the Russian economy has been growing recently, it may be in for a period of stress if the global recession leads to a further drop in oil prices just as significant amounts of the old Soviet debt come due in 2003.³ Dr. Rogov painted a dire scenario including an imminent return to the non-payment of government salaries,

sequestering budget funds, and inflation. Debt forgiveness could help relieve some of the stress, although the portion of the Soviet debt owed to the United States is quite small—no more \$500 million—so it is not clear to what extent the U.S. can persuade other countries to relieve Russian debts. However, if even the \$500 million were forgiven and if the Russian government were to devote the erstwhile payments to augment the Nunn-Lugar program, that would be a significant contribution to further reduction of nuclear weapons.

Overall, progress in Russia's economic integration into the West will depend less on debt relief and more on consistent progress in internal Russian economic reform, especially of the legal system, international accounting standards, and corporate governance. Only then will there be a substantial increase in Western direct investment, which would lead to greater Russian economic growth and participation in world markets.

Arms control and treaties

There was consensus among the participants that arms control should no longer be the main pillar of the Russian-American relationship. There was also general agreement that the Bush administration may have gone too far in removing formal arms control from the agenda. Several participants said that the two countries needed to move to a new nuclear relationship that was not based on mutual assured destruction. There was some skepticism expressed as to whether the Bush administration had a conception of what the new strategic nuclear relationship should be or how to get to it. Nuclear weapons cannot be made irrelevant to the relationship by mere assertion that they are irrelevant. The discussion turned to whether treaties—also referred to as “legally-binding agreements”—were a necessary component of the bilateral relationship. There was disagreement on this issue. Both Russian and American participants argued that no matter how informal initial talks may be, when the

3. The Russian budget for 2002 is based on an assumption that the price of oil will go no lower than \$18.50 a barrel. As of January 17, 2002, it was very close to that.

talks are over it is important to write down the conclusions reached. Mikhail Nosov noted that Russia and the Soviet Union had bad experiences in the recent past with non-binding agreements, for instance, on no NATO expansion upon German reunification and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe.

Some on the American side argued that it would be counter-productive to measure our relationship by the ability to sign a piece of paper at the end of a certain period. There was a perception that the process of negotiating treaties would be time consuming and could delay progress in developing the bilateral relationship. The American position has generally been that friends do not need treaties. Dr. Rogov pointed out that even close allies, such as the U.S. and Great Britain, sign treaties of mutual cooperation with each other.

The NATO-Russia relationship

We took advantage of Admiral Kuznetsov's presence and his impending assignment to Brussels to give him some advice on NATO. During the week, someone asked him what American admiral he knows. The answer was Fages—Vice Admiral Malcolm Fages, who Kuznetsov worked with on the CFE treaty, traveled with CNAC to Moscow and Vladivostok for seminars, and is now the Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. Admiral Fages visited CNAC in November 2001 and provided us useful insights on how NATO is working these days.

The discussions during the seminar and in other meetings around Washington focused on two distinct sets of issues—the new Committee of 20 mechanism for NATO-Russian cooperation and the issues that would be considered in this committee.

Mechanisms for NATO-Russian cooperation

There will be tension in any relationship between NATO and Russia so long as Russia is not a member because Russia does not like being an outsider in matters of European security. It does not want to be a full member of NATO either, at least not for the foreseeable future. There needed to be a more flexible arrangement than the current “2 vs. 1” relationship in the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). In the PJC, the NATO position has been worked out in advance, and thus the NATO side is confined to its instructions. No real give-and-take is possible as a result.

The NATO countries have agreed to set up a Committee of 20. In the new committee, the NATO countries have recognized that Russia ought to have a seat at the table from the start for discussions and for consensus-building on certain issues of concern to both the NATO countries and Russia. We discussed how in some ways this would be similar to the relationship France has with NATO, although the set of

issues on which Russia would be included would likely be more limited than is the case for France, which is, of course, a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty. As Admiral Kuznetsov pointed out, it would also be similar to the relationship Russia has with the G8, where there is a list of topics for which they meet as eight, and a list of other topics on which they meet as seven without Russia. The same mechanism could be used in NATO for the 20 or the 19.

The Committee of 20 is set in principle with the details to be worked out before the next NATO ministerial meeting in May in Reykjavik. In working out the details and their subsequent implementation will lie a lot of cultural learning, especially for the Russians, but for some Americans, too. Everyone will learn that there are no vetoes in NATO—the forming of consensus, committee discussions, and the sovereign respect that all member countries get, however small the country may be, has made it unnecessary and inappropriate to have votes or vetoes in NATO from its start in 1949.⁴

There was agreement at the seminar that the Committee of the 20 would focus primarily on political issues. As has always been the case, NATO headquarters would act as a switchboard to allow the participating countries to communicate with each other during consultations. As Admiral Kuznetsov pointed out, Russia would not want to participate in the integrated military command. Russia will not want its troops commanded by an American general and it would not want to subscribe to NATO doctrine.⁵

Admiral Kuznetsov addressed how the military cooperation mechanism between Russia and NATO works now. He noted that in Kosovo peacekeeping operations, Russia participates in accordance with the Helsinki agreement. There is a group of Russian military planners in Mons. SHAPE plans the KFOR operations, the Russians comment,

4. See "The Golden Rule of Consultation," Chapter II, in Harlan Cleveland, *NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970). The "silence procedure" was instituted by the first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay, and has remained the way NATO conducts its business to this day.

5. It was not clear what NATO doctrine he might be referring to.

then plans are directed to specific units. Previously, Russian planners just approved what was given to them, but now they participate directly in planning. In either case, Russia has never rejected a SHAPE directive for KFOR. Russia has thus gained a stake in the decision making, while other non-member states just follow NATO directives. Not much will change in this regard under the 20 mechanism, Kuznetsov argued. Russia will still be directly involved in the planning, while the other non-member states will continue to follow directives as they did in the past.

The group agreed that practical military cooperation along these lines could be extended once the habits of consultation and consensus-building had been established. Dr. Rogov proposed that such military cooperation could include strategic airlift training in peacetime, intelligence cooperation (including the possibility of sending a Russian AGI ship to the Indian Ocean), and regular contacts and exchanges at the combat unit level.

Issues to be addressed by the NATO-Russia Council

There was agreement that the three issues most likely to be addressed in the Committee of 20 would include the anti-terrorist campaign, arms control and non-proliferation, and peacekeeping operations.

Admiral Kuznetsov expressed the hope that the list of topics for the Committee of 20 would be developed jointly, rather than simply presented to Russia by NATO. He noted that he had hoped that European security issues could also be included in this list, but this has encountered resistance. He noted that the situation in Macedonia could have been resolved with Russian participation from the beginning. He argued that better consultation on European security issues would resolve some of the problems Russia has with the way these issues are decided. He hoped that NATO enlargement could be discussed in the Committee of 20, though he said that Russia would not try to claim a veto.

Other issues that Russian participants hoped could be addressed in the Committee of 20 included non-proliferation, naval cooperation

(e.g., search-and-rescue and training), and the possibility of dividing up arms markets in order to encourage Russian defense industries.⁶

Admiral Kuznetsov and General Yesin made clear that the Russians don't need NATO's Article 5 protection—they said Russia is self-sufficient in its own defense and does not want to participate in collective defense.⁷ American participants were resistant to the possibility of giving Russia a voice in deciding NATO enlargement questions, but were otherwise happy to see the agenda extended to other issues where agreement could be reached.

The steps toward the Committee of 20, if implemented in a politically sensitive manner, will go a long way toward assuaging Russian concerns about the admission of the Baltic states to NATO. Most think that is now inevitable, next November, at the NATO ministerial meeting in Prague. That is another issue that, like the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, may turn out to have fewer consequences for relations with Russia than many fear.

As the Russians begin to participate in the Committee of 20, they will find out what NATO "decision-making" is. Most NATO decision-making is haggling over words in communiqués. NATO is a switchboard where countries compare their positions, then reconcile them, and then refer them back to capitals for final reconciliation. The silence procedure operates rather than voting, and "breaking silence" to get changes in draft communiqués is considered a rather drastic step.

6. It has not been a practice across NATO history to use the NATO forum to divide up arms markets.

7. Some of us may worry about their capabilities to defend themselves, but it is premature to offer to help in their defense.

Naval relations

Relations between the U.S. and Russian navies continue to be limited by the Russian Navy's lack of funds. The Russian participants indicated that their navy is not likely to be upgraded in either the short or the long term. Despite this ongoing problem, the consensus of the workshop participants was that several areas for potential cooperation exist and should be exploited. The continuing navy-to-navy contacts over the course of the last decade can prove valuable in maintaining and expanding cooperation in the future.

The new Russian Naval Doctrine calls for the Russian Navy to engage in new missions involving maritime economic activities. To the extent that such missions are undertaken, there may be room for developing cooperation between the Russian Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard, in addition to the cooperation that already exists between the Russian Maritime Border Guards and the U.S. Coast Guard.

In the more immediate future, the Russian participants were particularly interested in increasing the number of ship visits by U.S. ships to Russian ports. They pointed out that U.S. ships have been visiting Russia since 1994 and that Russia has never turned down a request for a U.S. ship visit. They were particularly eager for the opportunity to see how U.S. ships operate and how the sailors live. Russian ship visits to the U.S. were not discussed. The lack of funds and maintenance make such long cruises unlikely for the Russian Navy for a while.⁸

Both sides seemed interested in increasing the number of navy-to-navy exercises. Russia has resumed exercise planning in the RUKUS framework and is hoping to use this framework to increase naval cooperation with both the United States and the United Kingdom.⁹ The potential of including submarines in exercises was discussed, but

8. They did send two *Udaloy* destroyers from Vladivostok to the Indian International Naval Review in 2001.

it was noted that such decisions would have to be made by political leaders. There was also some discussion of the potential for American admirals who work on operations and planning to participate in seminars in Russia.

Another key area for cooperation involves increasing intelligence cooperation and other joint efforts in the Indian Ocean as part of the effort to fight the terrorist threat in that region. Both sides seemed interested in undertaking such an effort, while stressing that actual progress would require a policy decision.

Finally, the two sides discussed the potential for increasing cooperation and direct discussions between the two sides' submarine communities. The Russian side has been interested in discussions on safety rules among submarines, as an alternative to their old submarine-free zones proposal. There seems to be agreement within both navies that it is time for the submarine communities to begin direct talks.

9. RUKUS = Russia-US-UK. It is a series of discussions and games that dates back to 1990. It was first hosted at Brown University, then moved to the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, and since then has rotated among the three countries. It is of special value because the Russians have been in on the planning and design of the discussions and games from the beginning. They were not joining someone else's ongoing discussions.

Status of the U.S.-Russian relationship

The seminar discussions lead to some conclusions on the future of the Russian-American relationship. One problem is that fighting the current common enemy—bin Laden and al Qaeda—is a fragile basis on which to sustain the relationship. Al Qaeda may eventually be defeated and dispersed, and in any case, it is not going to take over the world. The task of tracking down terrorists will continue for a long time, and could lead to operations like those in Afghanistan (e.g., in Somalia), but much of the continuing effort may fall to law-enforcement agencies. More traditional Russian-American military cooperation must be found in other areas.

There are several other new positives that have emerged in recent months: U.S. awareness of Russia's problems with Chechnya, the agreement on reducing strategic nuclear offensive weapons numbers, work on debt forgiveness, cooperation in Central Asia, as well as the NATO Committee of 20.

There are also some remaining negatives that people in Washington conveyed to the Russian group on this occasion: Russian sales of nuclear technology to Iran, tensions in the Caucasus (particularly between Russia and Georgia), and both sides' relations with China.

It appears that the U.S. and Russia can move beyond the ABM treaty. The day after the U.S. declared that it would withdraw from the treaty, President Putin reacted mildly. The Russians seem reconciled to it. The Russians kept talking to us about "the end of strategic stability," but they are always vague about what that means. They worry about proliferation, but then they scoff at us for being so concerned about poor countries trying to build missiles by bolting together old Scuds.

The Russians do say they will have to abandon START I, and all its verification and monitoring provisions, because their instrument of ratification linked it with the continuation of the ABM treaty. The U.S.

didn't make that link. They have long said they will MIRV TOPOL-M, but right now they are building only 6 a year of those missiles. Admiral Kuznetsov said, "We will abandon START I and go down to 500 weapons—that's all we need for deterrence." General Yesin said (as General Dvorkin has said in the past) that Russia no longer worries about parity. Given this situation, even the Russians were hard pressed to describe a downside for the United States if Russia were to abandon START I.

Dr. Rogov advocates a U.S.-Russian mutual security treaty sometime in the future, noting that the United States has many mutual security treaties with friends.¹⁰ He recognizes that striving for such a treaty would be premature at present. Dr. Rogov also hinted that CFE ought to be abandoned as obsolete, on the same basis that the ABM treaty was considered obsolete (i.e., a rigid parity agreement among enemies).

In practical measures, working on non-proliferation, against piracy, intelligence cooperation, and planning of peacekeeping operations were mentioned as areas for consultation, in addition to the war on terror.

What does the longer run look like?

Russia's positive attitudes toward the West and cooperation depend heavily on Putin. His image is bearing up very well. He has taken, or is promoting, many of the right steps towards the rule of law. So far, he has been a leader, pulling reluctant bureaucrats and the military along, at least in the security sphere (it almost seems that he is facing less resistance on the economic side, except for sweeping land reform).

Military cooperation will depend heavily on the performance of the Russian economy. That is, practical cooperation depends on resources for travel, and for the operations of ships, aircraft, and other vehicles. The Russian economy may have turned the corner. It

10. Although many of those mutual security treaties were concluded under Cold War conditions.

may be at take-off. But there are a lot of problems with it as yet. If the economy doesn't perform well, government revenues languish, and the military languishes. If the military doesn't have a sufficient budget, it can't cooperate internationally. If it does have enough funds, they are eager to cooperate.

But there's still a big question as to whether military reform and restructuring can proceed in Russia.

- Putin has said that they have to reduce manpower if they are to modernize. He makes it very clear that they are under budget restrictions and controls. He still wants to end conscription and supports a professional military
- The military resists—most of them are still date from the Cold War. Until they have creative opportunities, they will wallow in the past and in paranoia.
- It is simply not clear what the model of a reformed Russian military would be. They only know how to do a reduced Soviet force.¹¹
- Chechnya still looms over the military establishment. It is not clear to us what the military role is there now, since the FSB is now running the operation. A military cannot operate and reform at the same time—as we in the U.S. know.
- But without reform and without funds, it will be hard for the Russian military to operate with other militaries, unless special arrangements are made, as in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The U.S. has its own restraints. It has lots of other places with which it is concerned around the world. The U.S. likes to have coalition partners, but they have to be able to perform and cooperate. The major resources the U.S. has put into relations with Russia are those for dismantling and securing the detritus of the Cold War—nuclear weapons and materials. The war on terror presents a real opportunity

11. Overall, U.S. forces also do not look very different in their structures from those of the Cold War, although they have modernized those forces in significant ways, as demonstrated in Afghanistan.

for cooperation, especially given the proximity of Afghanistan to Russia and the continuing war in Chechnya. It will take a long time to round up and defang al Qaeda. Intelligence, financial networks, al Qaeda fading into desolate areas, non-proliferation, all could involve some Russian and American cooperation. But it will be a sidelight to the main business of either country, which may be mainly economic within the global context.

Both sides face the difficult issue of persuading reluctant bureaucracies to implement verbal agreements reached between the presidents. Signed agreements may force the second and third tier officials to more diligently implement the leaders' decisions. At the same time, the establishment of institutionalized contact mechanisms and working groups between the two sides may work to gradually dispel the distrust that is prevalent at the lower tiers in both countries.

Appendix

How NATO works: a one-page summary

NATO is horizontal—an association of sovereign countries. NATO is not a super-sovereign, and it is almost always more useful to refer to “NATO countries” than to “NATO” alone. Politically, the NATO countries operate on a wheel-spoke-and-hub basis: countries around the rim, Brussels in the center, government cables as rim and spokes. Brussels is a convenient switchboard, where countries compare and reconcile their positions. It is very powerful when 2-3-4 of the bigger countries coordinate their positions before airing them in committee. It is least powerful for the Secretary General (SYG) or the international bureaucracies to propose something. Unlike the UN, NATO countries do not vote—they express views—so there is no veto if there are no votes.¹² There is no decision-making, either, except as the countries hammer out the words of a communiqué—until the alliance went to war for the first time over Kosovo. The SYG is neutral: he proposes a consensus upon hearing positions. Then there is silence or changes proposed. But any country position is “ad referendum” back to capitals, if not consistent with initial guidance. The outcomes are what I have observed as “the earliest common denominator” (not “the least common denominator”).

NATO is vertical—it has an Integrated Military Organization: international military staffs that survey and pretend to plan member countries’ forces and serve as commands in war. This is unique among alliances, past and present, except for the Warsaw Pact. The process of force planning continues even a decade after the end of the Cold War: force proposals are made, force goals set at the political level,

12. See the chapter, “The Golden Rule of Consultation,” in Cleveland, *Op. cit.* The exception is the admission of new members, which the North Atlantic Treaty says must be “unanimous.”

War: force proposals are made, force goals set at the political level, and countries respond to the NATO DPQ (Defense Planning Questionnaire). The process tries to buck up countries' defense efforts and get them to follow some standards in equipment. The process is honored in the breach, but it promotes great transparency, as countries report their efforts and budgets in great detail. The IMO organizes exercises and coordinates Partnership for Peace (PFP) activities. Altogether, the IMO constitutes an association of professional military establishments.

A bottom line: Countries "decide," not international bureaucracies (unlike the EU in some aspects). My mentor on NATO matters (who was one of the first staff officers at SHAPE) told me, "NATO has no idea or way to got to war" (it just had an alert system to regulate the countries' scramble to defend). It never did, until Kosovo. Then the wheel-spoke-and-hub worked (see above).